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Klingler: Constitutional Law: Endorsing a New Test for Establishment Clause

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ENDORSING A NEW TEST FOR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
Elenore Cotter Klingler"
Petitioner adopted a policy that permitted student-led prayer over the
loudspeaker at school football games.' Respondents sued to prevent
Petitioner from enacting the policy.2 The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas upheld the policy, but required that the prayer be
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that even such restricted prayer was unconstitutional and
invalid because the policy had been initiated by school officials.4 The
United States Supreme Court granted review,5 and in affirming the court
of appeals, HELD, that the policy violated the Establishment Clause 6 by
encouraging prayer at government-sponsored events.7
The principle of the Establishment Clause has been difficult to force
into an easy-to-apply test." The United States Supreme Court has made
several attempts to more narrowly define the Establishment Clause, but no
test has completely satisfied all needs.9 The seminal effort to construct a
test was made in 1971.10

My deepest love and gratitude goes to Rob Klingler, my husband, who encourages me
in everything I do.
1. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). Petitioner adopted a
succession of policies on this subject; the one at issue in the instant case was adopted in October
1995. Id. at 296.
2. Id. at 295.
3. Id. at 294.
4. Id. at 299. The court of appeals applied three separate tests to the Petitioner's policy: the
three-pronged Lemon test, the "coercion" test, and the "endorsement" test. The policy was invalid
under all three. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep, Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 814-15, 816-18 (5th Cir. 1999),
afd, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
5. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.....
7. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
8. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971) ("The language of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque....").
9. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice
O'Connor stated, "[I]t is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should
govern their application." Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm 'n,
397 U.S. 664,694 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
10. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
*
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Court created a very specific test to
determine the constitutionality of government action toward religion.12 The
issue in Lemon was whether two statutes, one from Rhode Island, 3 and one
from Pennsylvania,14 violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the Constitution. 5 The Rhode Island statute provided a salary
supplement of fifteen percent to private school teachers of secular
subjects. 6 The Pennsylvania statute reimbursed private schools for some
secular expenditures, such as teacher salaries and books. 7 Both statutes
required the schools to segregate religious expenditures from secular, and
also required the state to maintain surveillance over the separation.
Using a new three-pronged test, the Court held that both statutes were
unconstitutional. 9 Any statute that had an effect on religion had to satisfy
all three requirements of the test in order to be constitutional." The three
requirements were: first, that the statute must have a secular purpose;
second, that the statute must neither have the effect of advancing nor
inhibiting religion; and finally, that the statute must not "excessively
entangle" the government with religion.21
Applying the test to the two statutes, the Court found that although both
had a secular purpose, they failed the third part of the test.' The
governmental oversight required by the statute fostered too great a
connection between the government and the religious aspects of the
schools. 2 3 For this reason, the statutes were unconstitutional.24

11. Id.
12. Id at 612-13. The Court pulled together holdings from Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) and Walzv. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) to develop the three prongs of the
Lemon test. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607 n.1 (citing the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, RI. GEN
LAWS ANN. § 16-51-1 etseq. (1970)).
14. Id. at 609 n.3 (citing the Pensylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act,PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 §§ 5601-5609 (1971)).
15. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
16. Id. at 607. The salaries of the recipient teachers could not exceed the maximum paid to
public school teachers. Id.
17. Id. at 609.
18. Id. at 619, 620.
19. Id. at 625.
20. Id. at 612. The Court made the point that the Establishment Clause covered more ground
than simply "establishing a religion." A law that "respected" religion could still violate the
Constitution, even if it did not "establish" a church. Id
21. Id at 612-13.
22. Id. at613-14.
23. Id at619-21.
24. Id. at 625.
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The Court used the Lemon test to decide nearly every Establishment
Clause case for fifteen years after its creation.' However, despite its use
by the majority, the Lemon test was criticized for its lack of specificity.26
In Wallace v. Jaffree," Justice O'Connor proposed an alternative criterion,
the "endorsement" test.28
The issue in Wallace was the constitutionality of an Alabama statute
' After
that authorized a moment of silence for "meditation or prayer."29
applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional because it did not have any secular purpose."
Applying the other two prongs of the test was unnecessary.
In a strong concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested an alternative to
the often ambiguous Lemon test." She outlined what she called the
"endorsement" test, which was premised upon the idea that governmentsponsored religion sends a message of exclusivity to nonparticipants.32
Under the endorsement test, direct government action is invalid if it
endorses religion or a religious sect.33 When using this test, it is necessary
to consider the purpose of the government message by examining the
history, language, and context of the message.34 Though the Court should
' deference should be granted to the
not accept a "sham secular purpose,"35
stated intent of the government when determining the purpose of the
message. 6 Using the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor argued, would
allow a clear and consistent analysis of Establishment Clause cases.37

25. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) ("It is the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon...
have we addressed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-pronged test.").

26. See, e.g., id.at68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Despite its initial promise, theLemon test
has proved problematic."); id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The three-part test represents a
determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only
be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service.").

27. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
28. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
29. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41-42. The district court in this case held that the purpose of the
statute was to encourage prayer; however, it ruled that the Constitution did not forbid Alabama from
establishing a state religion. Jla at 41.
30. Id. at 59.

31. See id.at 68-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 69. Justice O'Connor stated, "it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."' Id. (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 at 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

33. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

35. Id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. lod at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The Court did not adopt the endorsement test, but in Lee v. Weisman,3
the Court did seem to adopt the reasoning behind it. In reaching its
decision, the Court focused on the exclusionary, coercive pressure
government-sponsored religion creates. The issue in Lee was whether the
practice of inviting members of clergy to give benedictions at the official
public school graduation violated the Establishment Clause. 39 The Court
declined to use or address the Lemon test in its decision.4" Instead, the
Court focused on the coercive pressure that the presence of prayer in
school has on students.41
The school in Lee invited a rabbi from the community to give the
invocation at the graduation ceremony. 42 The rabbi was instructed to be
nondenominational and to focus on "inclusiveness." 43 Attendance at the
graduation ceremony was optional, in that nonattending students would
still receive diplomas.44
The Court found the practice to be an unacceptable coercive pressure
on the students. It held that prayer in schools conveyed a powerful social
pressure to conform that children may feel compelled to follow. 45 Prayer
at a graduation ceremony was especially coercive because a student did not
have a true choice to avoid attendance. 46 Accordingly, and without reliance
upon either Lemon or an explicit adoption of the endorsement test, the
Court held school-sponsored prayer at graduations to be unconstitutional.47
The instant Court inherited this variety ofprecedential tests. In deciding
the instant case,48 the instant Court appears to have adopted Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test.49 Very little mention was made of Lemon or
of the coercion reasoning from Lee.
The traditional practice of Petitioner was to permit an elected student
chaplain to deliver a prayer over the loudspeaker before each home football

38. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
39. Id.at 580.
40. Id at 587. Both the district court and court of appeals, however, did use the Lemon test.
They both determined that the graduation benediction policy violated the test. Id. at 584-86.
41. Id. at 588. The court of appeals in the instant case considered this stance to be a separate
test, apart from eithertheLemontestortheendorsementtest. Doev. Santa FeIndep. Sch. Dist., 168
F.3d 806, 814-15, 816-18 (5th Cir. 1999), affid, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

42. Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
43. Id. The invocation and benediction given by the rabbi in this case each mentioned a
specific religious figure(God) once. They both were of ageneral religious nature. See id.at581-82.

44. Id. at 583.
45. Id. at 593.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 595.
Id. at 599.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
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game. 0 Respondents"' sued to prevent this and other similar practices.5 2
Following the district court's decision to permit nonsectarian,
nonproseltyzing prayer,53 Petitioner adopted a succession ofpolicies on the
matter.5 4 The policy concerning the instant case was adopted in October,
but the election conducted under the August policy stood." The October
policy authorized a vote among students as to whether an invocation5 6
should be allowed at football games. If the students voted to have an
invocation, it authorized a second vote to select a student speaker to deliver
it. 7 The policy did not require the invocation to be nonsecular or
nonproseltyzing, unless so directed by a court.5" The court of appeals
rejected the invocation policy entirely as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.59
The instant Court affirmed the decision ofthe court of appeals and held
that the policy was facially6 unconstitutional.6 The instant court found
that there was direct government involvement in the policy.6' It reasoned
that Petitioner was too closely tied to the religious nature of the message,
because the policy permitted one student to speak an approved message at
a school-sponsored event.63 The instant Court also noted that the elections
themselves were initiated by Petitioner and thus constituted state action."
The instant Court determined that, despite Petitioner's protests to the

50. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294.
51. Respondents were two students and their mothers. One was Mormon, the other Catholic.
Their identities were kept secret to avoid harassment. Id.; see also id. at 294 n. I (quoting the district
court's order threatening to hold Petitioner in contempt for its attempts to determine the identity
of Respondents).
52. Respondents alleged that Petitioner conducted a variety of proselytizing practices,
including encouraging attendance at Baptist events, scolding children for having other religious
beliefs, and permitting religious invocations at graduations. 1d. at 295.
53. Id. at 296.
54. Id. Petitioner adopted policies on the issue in May, July, August, and October. The May
and July policies regarded prayer at graduation, and the August and October policies regarded
prayer at football games. Id. at 296-98.
55. Id. at 298 n.5.
56. The word "invocation" was a change from the August policy, which used the word
"prayer." Id
57. Id. at 297.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 299.
60. Id. at 316. The instant Court answered the dissent's argument that the majority had acted
before any speech was made. It pointed out that the enactment alone of the policy violated the
Establishment Clause. Id.
61. Id at317.
62. Id. at 302-03.
63. Id. The instant Court rejected Petitioner's argument that the invocation was an
individual's message at a limited public forum, and thus, private speech. Id.
64. Id. at 306.
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contrary,65 the policy was enacted with the purpose of endorsing a
particular religious viewpoint.' An examination of the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the policy made that clear to the instant
Court.67 The instant Court found that the purpose of the policy was to
encourage prayer," and also that the policy was enacted in a way that
excluded the minority.69 For those reasons, the instant Court held that the
policy violated the Establishment Clause and was thus unconstitutional.7"
In an emphatic dissent,7 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
majority was acting in a fashion hostile to religion in general.' He pointed
out that the policy had not yet been enacted, and contended that the
majority had acted too quickly to decide the case.7" Finally, he argued that
the majority had used the strictest test available74 and had not given proper
deference to the stated intent of Petitioner.7'
In its decision in the instant case, the United States Supreme Court has
retreated further from the Lemon test, and moved toward Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test. Chief Justice Rehnquist and other analysts
have suggested that the Court reaffirmed its commitment to Lemon in this
decision.76 However, in its opinion, the Court briefly mentions the test only
once, 7 and instead relies heavily on the reasoning and wording of the

65. The instant court was very skeptical of Petitioner's explanations. It stated, "The District,

nevertheless, asks us to pretend that we do not recognize what every Santa Fe High School student
understands clearly-that this policy is about prayer. The District further asks us to accept what is
obviously untrue: that these messages are necessary to 'solemnize' a football game..... Id.at 315.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 314-15.
68. Id. at 315.
69. Id. at 317.
70. Id.
71. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissented from the majority.

Id. at 318.
72. Id at 318, 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("It is also conceivable that the election could lead
to a Christian prayer before 90 percent of the football games... [b]ut it is possible that the students

might vote not to have a pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a constitutional
violation."). But cf id at 295 n.2 (quoting the graduation invocation given at Petitioner's school,
"Lord, bless this ceremony and give us all a safe journey home. In Jesus' name we pray.").
74. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the

majority used the Lemon test to decide the instant case. Id.
75. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Firm andNecessary Line, L.A. TIMES,
June 20, 2000, at B8 ("closely watched cases, underscored by nearly 40 years of precedent"); Tony
Mauro, Court Tackles Prayerat FootballGames, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2000, at 8. ("The ruling

suggests a recommitment by the Court to the strict 'Lemon Test' for evaluating church-state
cases . . .. ).

77. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (referring to the Lemon test).
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1001

endorsement test.78 This, combined with the steady criticism of Lemon,79
suggests that the Court has all but officially dispensed with the Lemon test.
The Court begins its analysis of the instant case with an examination of
the degree ofstate involvement in the policy and the context of the policy's
adoption.8" The directness of the state involvement is the first part of the
endorsement test.8' After determining that Petitioner initiated and approved
of the policy,82 the Court considers the context of the policy and its
adoption. 3 In discussing the context, the Court uses language similar to
Justice O'Connor's in Wallace. 4 The Court quotes her directly three
times.85
Throughout its decision, the Court is concerned with the exclusive
nature of the policy.86 The fact that the policy was decided by election is
especially troubling to the Court.8 7 A majoritarian process like an election
guarantees that minority voices will not be heard and may further exclude
them from the community. 8 This sense of exclusivity caused by
government endorsement of religion is the very basis of Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test.8 9
Despite the Court's cursory mention of Lemon, it does not seem to rely
upon it to any great extent. In fact, in the one instance in which the Court
cites to Lemon, it is in support of the need to examine the context of the
policy.' An examination of context as a means to determine the purpose
of an action is a central tenet of the endorsement test.9'
The final portion of the endorsement test is the need to be deferential
to the stated purpose of the governmental action.92 Chief Justice Rehnquist

78. See, e.g., id.at 307-10, 315-17.

79. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
80. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306-07.
81. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
82. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305 ("Contrary to the District's repeated assertions that it has
adopted a 'hands-off' approach to the pregame invocation, the realities of the situation plainly
reveal that its policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of religion.").
83. Id. at307-08.
84. See id. at 307. "The actual or perceived endorsement of the message, moreover, is
established by factors beyond just the text of the policy." Id.
85. See id. at 308, 309-10.

86. See id. at 309-10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), to support the
point that such religious policies emphasize the "outsider" nature of nonadherents).
87. Id.at 304-05.
88. Id at 304 ("[Tlhe majoritarian process implemented by the District guarantees, by
definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively
silenced.").
89. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
90. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314.

91. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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is especially critical that the majority did not give enough weight to the
stated purpose of Petitioner's policy.93 To him, this indicates an undue
haste to decide the case against Petitioner and a hostility to religion in
general.94 Though Justice O'Connor specifically suggests that there is no
need to accept a "sham secular purpose,"9 " the Court does quickly
disregard Petitioner's stated purpose.9 6 The evidence from the district court
of bad-faith actions97 by Petitioner and the multiple policies" themselves
do strongly suggest that Petitioner's espoused secular intent was not in
good faith. However, the extreme nature of Petitioner's actions may have
led the Court to act hastily" in deciding the instant case, possibly
damaging its precedential value.
It is difficult, from this case alone, to determine if the Court has
abandoned Lemon, because the policy would probably fail under either the
Lemon test or the endorsement test."' However, it does appear that the
Court has at least relied heavily upon the reasoning of the endorsement

93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
94. SantaFe, 530 U.S. at 318. "But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the
Court's opinion; it bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 ("The text and history of this policy, moreover,
reinforce our objective student's perception that the prayer is, in actuality, encouraged by the
school.").
97. As noted in supranote 51, the district court had to issue a very strongly worded order to
stop Petitioner's attempts to discover the identities of Respondents. See also Colbert I. King, How
They Prayedin Texas, WASH. POST, June 24,2000, at A23, describing repeated harassment of a
Jewish teenager who attended a school in the Santa Fe Independent School District. The parents
of the boy reported that the administration had been repeatedly unresponsive to her complaints.
98. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 296. After the district court's order that prayer be
nondenominational, Petitioner created a policy to address prayer at football games. It specifically
mentioned the word "prayer," and student elections were held to determine whether a prayer would
be said at games. In October, Petitioner created a new policy that used the words "messages" and
"statements" instead of the word "prayer." However, no new elections took place under this new
policy. Id. at 298 n.5. The Court took this as evidence that the stated secular purpose of the policy
was not in good faith, and the true purpose was to support religion. Id. at 309.
99. See id. at 319, 320-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (questioning why the majority
decided the case before the policy had been enacted).
100. The three prongs of Lemon are that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose,
its primary affect must not inhibit nor advance religion, and it must not excessively entangle the
government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Petitioner's policy
has a purported secular purpose, butthe level of deference required underthe Lemon test is unclear.
Related to the first issue is whether the policy's primary effect would be good sportsmanship, as
suggested by Petitioner in Santa Fe (Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S., at 309), or whether its
primary effect would be to promote religion. In either case, it is likely that the election process
arranged by Petitioner would be considered "excessive entanglement." For that reason, the policy
would probably not pass the Lemon test.
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test. This suggests that the Court may intend to rely on the endorsement
test in future decisions regarding the Establishment Clause.
Some analysts have suggested that the endorsement test is more
accommodating to religion than the Lemon test. 1 ' This is most clear when
the issue concerns government funding of religious programs. 11 2 Using the
Lemon test, it is very difficult for a government to fund a religious group,
because the oversight needed to avoid an Establishment Clause problem
itself causes such a problem." 3 In contrast, the endorsement test would
often permit a government to fund a religious organization. The
government would simply have to be certain that its expressed purpose was
a secular one that did not endorse the religion directly.'4 The endorsement
test's deference to the government's stated purpose would likely permit
many purposes that would be considered "excessive entanglement" under
the Lemon test.
However, outside of funding, it is not entirely clear that the
endorsement test would be more lenient than the Lemon test. One issue that
highlights the similarities between the results of the endorsement test and
the Lemon test is that of student-led prayer at graduations. Though the
Court ruled on school-initiated prayer in Lee," 5 it did not reach a decision
as to whether voluntary student prayer would be acceptable. Various
interest groups have already made predictions about the Court's future
position on this issue. 6
The application of the Lemon test would probably result in the finding
that the presence of prayer at a school function is excessive entanglement
and thus unconstitutional."0 7 The result under the endorsement test is
similar. If the school sponsored an election for a student speaker, as in the
instant case, the policy would probably be unconstitutional. The school's
101. See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 76, at 8.
102. See Wallacev. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,109 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[I]t creates
an 'insoluble paradox' in school aid cases: we have required aid to parochial schools to be closely
watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself will create an
entanglement.").
103. This was the very problem in Lemon itself. The two school-funding programs were
declared unconstitutional because the oversight needed to control them was itself entangling.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-21.
104. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
105. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
106. See Mauro, supranote 76, at 8 (quoting Steven Shapiro of the American Civil Liberties
Union and Jan LaRue of the Family Research Council).
107. A policy permitting prayer at graduation would also have difficulty arriving at a secular
purpose, the first prong of Lemon. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The only possibility of developing
a secular purpose would be that of "solemnizing" the occasion, which was one of the purposes
advanced by Petitioner in the instant case. The instant court seemed skeptical of the practice. Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) ("[T]he use of an invocation to foster such
solemnity is impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes prayer sponsored by the school.").
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participation in a religious interlude at a school fimction would likely be
too great an endorsement of religion, even if the prayer were spoken by a
student."8 Even if the students themselves decided to vote on the issue, the
majoritarian process of an election might trigger the exclusivity concern of
the endorsement test."0 9 The only options left to those wishing to pray at
graduation would be either a private invocation outside of the graduation,
or a general "moment of silence," such as in Wallace."0 Neither of these
options would exclude those who did not wish to participate, and neither
is particularly accommodating to religion. In this context, it seems the
endorsement test is not more lenient than the Lemon test.
Future decisions from the Supreme Court may clarify this and other
issues. However, until that time, lower courts face some confusion in
precedent."' The Court has upheld in the instant case its long history of
keeping separate the realms of church and state. At the same time, though,
it has left the determination of an appropriate test in doubt. The Court has
backed away from the Lemon test without officially adopting a
replacement, such as the endorsement test. With such a precedent in place,
lower courts may find themselves reaching the right decision in
Establishment Clause cases for the wrong reason.

108. It may be more difficult for this policy to pass the endorsement test than the Lemon test.
The government would have to demonstrate that, by allowing an election, it was not endorsing a
particular religion or religion in general. Even with the deference shown to the government under
the endorsement test, it may be difficult for the government to prove a true, and not a "sham"
secular purpose.
109. A voluntary movement by the students to have prayer at their graduation would avoid
direct government involvement in the election. However, merely allowing an election to decide
whether to have prayer at a school function may be problematic. The underlying purpose of the
endorsement test is to avoid the message of exclusivity that government-sponsored religion creates.
See supranote 32 and accompanying text. An election in which the minority voice is not heard goes
to the heart of this problem, and was a major factor in the instant court's decision. Santa Fe, 530
U.S. at 316-17.
110. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Ill. See supranote 4 (referring to the court of appeals' use of all three tests in deciding Santa
Fe).
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